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SUBJECT: QKBRGIL

**Objective of Project:** (a) To fortify hope of liberation among Rumanian people and foster their will to resist communization; (b) establish clandestine underground for implementation of US policy vis-a-vis Soviet Orbit. This apparatus should be capable on short notice of hampering any Soviet-Satellite move against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey and serving as a nucleus for effective wartime resistance; (c) undermine by combination of covert operations, including PW, political, economic, and military structure of Communist Rumania; (d) develop NCEE Political Center as cover for overt activities and covert operational support arm for OPC operations.

**Hqs. Case Officer:** ☐

**Station Responsible:** Frankfurt; Munich; Trieste.

**Date of Project Approval:** Approved by PRC on 9 August 1951 and AITC on 28 August 1951.

**Date of Project Renewals:** See below.

**Date Present Approval expires:** Upon approval of Project SHELLFIRE, which supersedes QKBRGIL. *(SHELLFIRE Approved 1 July 54 for FY 55) PM activity only.*

**Date Terminated, if applicable:** The original concept of Project QKBRGIL was to provide sufficient staff personnel and materiel to maintain a semi-autonomous base for PW-PM activities. In order to reach a more realistic basis upon which to fulfill the requirements of US and SHAPE war plans, the overall Project QKBRGIL is being broken down and submitted in component projects. With approval of SHELLAC, on 18 December 1953, the PW objectives of QKBRGIL were terminated.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007


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PROJECT: QKBRGIL

**Cryptos and functions of personnel participating, and dates of clearance:**

Because of the number of people slotted against QKBRGIL, but who were actually assigned to other projects, it would be impossible to compile a complete list of personnel and their functions under Project QKBRGIL. The following, both headquarters and field personnel, represent what is considered to be the hard-core QKBRGIL staff:



Chief Officer (Hqs.)  
 [redacted]  
 Chief Officer (Hqs.)  
 Chief Officer (Frankfurt)  
 Chief Officer (Munich)  
 Chief Officer [redacted]  
 Chief Officer (Munich)  
 Chief Officer (Munich)  
 Interpreter-Trans. (Frankfurt)  
 Interpreter (Frankfurt)  
 Administrative Asst. (Frankfurt)  
 Training Officer (Frankfurt)  
 Training Officer (Frankfurt)  
 Operations Officer (Munich)  
 Chief Officer [redacted]  
 Reports Officer [redacted]  
 Chief Asst. [redacted]  
 Chief Officer [redacted]  
 Consultant (Washington)  
 Consultant (Washington)  
 Consultant (Washington)  
 Operations Officer Intelligence (Hqs.)  
 Interpreter - Interpreter

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PROJECT: QKBROIL

Funds allotted for period: See next page.

Funds expended as of: See next page.

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# QUARTERLY BUDGET - [ ]

Month

FI allotment to date obligations through [ ] FY 1955 and will be allocated as the budget for Project SILENT for FY 1955.

Aug. 1951  
 Sept.  
 Oct.  
 Nov.  
 Dec.  
 Jan. 1952  
 Feb.  
 Mar.  
 Apr.  
 May  
 June  
 July  
 Aug.  
 Sept.  
 Oct.  
 Nov.  
 Dec.  
 Jan. 1953  
 Feb.  
 Mar.  
 Apr.  
 May  
 June  
 July  
 Aug.  
 Sept.  
 Oct.  
 Nov.  
 Dec.  
 Jan. 1954  
 Feb.  
 Mar.  
 Apr.  
 May  
 June  
 July

\* [ ] was requested for FY 1955 and will be allocated as the budget for Project SILENT for FY 1955.

PROJECT: QKBRGIL

**Special Equipment Used:**

Communications equipment for radio broadcasting  
Weapons  
Operational equipment (parachutes, clothing, etc.)  
Warehouse and maintenance equipment  
Vehicles  
Office equipment  
Barter material (needles, drugs, razor blades, nylon, etc.)



PROJECT: QKBROIL

### Brief Review of Organization and Method of Operations

QKBROIL was established to implement the OPC Plan for Rumania, which envisaged the utilization of all available covert assets to exploit the resistance potential in Rumania, undermine the Soviet power complex, develop a covert offensive in support of U.S. policy aims in the Balkans, and, in the event of war, to assist in the accomplishment of Allied war aims.

As the first step in the implementation of Project QKBROIL, an attempt was made to establish a political center composed of leading exiled Rumanians who were sympathetic with U.S. policy objectives to serve as a rallying point for democratic resistance forces inside Rumania and in exile, to serve as a cover for OPC-sponsored operations, and to serve as a covert support arm for CIA/OPC. In the U.S. there were two principal opposing emigre groups, the Rumanian National Committee and the Association of Free Rumanians, which controlled the sentiments of the majority of the Rumanian refugees. During the life of QKBROIL, all attempts to form a single unified Rumanian emigration met with failure because of the inability of these two groups to work together. Today (July 1954), these two factions are no closer to unifying themselves than they have been at any time in the past. Unless King Mihai takes some positive step to reorganize the present Rumanian National Committee, which has his support, to include members of the Association, there can be no chance that the two groups will ever overcome their differences. Because of this stalemate, QKBROIL was forced to begin operations without the benefit of a political front organization in whose name QKBROIL activities could be carried out.

Concurrently, plans were undertaken to establish a PW unit initially in Athens, Greece, since communications facilities for radio broadcasting were available for use in the Rumanian program. Due to a variety of circumstances, the unit was not activated under the QKBROIL project and the PW activities were confined to a leaflet campaign. The first leaflet drop into Rumania was made on the night of 2 October 1952, when approximately 110,000 leaflets were disseminated. Since that time, approximately 2,200,000 leaflets have been dropped into Rumania and according to reports received, the leaflet campaign has been extremely effective. On 18 December 1953, with the approval of Project SHELLAC, a component project of QKBROIL, the PW functions were separated from QKBROIL.

In order to carry out the P objectives of QKBROIL, plans were formulated whereby negotiations were undertaken with the Turkish Government to base the QKBROIL field installation in that country. It was thought that Turkey, because of its proximity to the target area, offered the ideal location for an operational field base. However, after months of negotiations, Turkish approval of the base was not granted and a new location had to be considered. The field headquarters for Rumanian operations finally was established in Trieste on 15 December 1952.

In the meantime, an Operations Officer, three PW training officers, an

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PROJECT QKBRILL

Brief Resume of Organization and Method of Operation: (continued)

Interpreter-Translator and two agent recruiters were sent to Frankfurt to spot, recruit and train agent personnel for use in the QKBRILL program. Out of 11 agents spotted and cleared, three were recruited and trained for an infiltration mission (SDMER) which never materialized. One agent was sent to Panama for several months "cooling-off" period and later returned to Germany; the other two agents were released in Germany. The QKBRILL staff personnel were absorbed, to all intents and purposes, in the RM complex in Germany.

During November 1952, the regular member staff of QKBRILL was sent to Trieste. From the beginning activities at the Trieste base were limited. The first few months consisted of the administrative details necessary to the establishment of an operating base. In November 1953, [ ] was closed because of the political situation in Trieste. The staff was split up, some members returning to the U.S. while others were sent to [ ] where they were absorbed by the [ ] staff.

QKBRILL has now been superseded by Project SHELLFIRE, which is administrative in nature and is intended to furnish administrative support to those PP and PM operations which are not yet provided for under other projects for Rumania and to provide funds for existing operational opportunities that may arise but which are outside the scope of existing PP projects.



PROJECT: QKBRCIL

**Brief Account of Intelligence Produced:**

QKBRCIL was a PP-PM project and as such any intelligence produced was a by-product of QKBRCIL activities.



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PROJECT: QUEBEC

Other Accomplishments:

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PROJECT: QKEROIL

**Observed Weaknesses - Brief Critique and Suggested Improvements:**

The CPC Plan for Rumania covered the period from 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1953 and was based on the general assumptions that overt hostilities would not begin prior to 30 June 1953 but could, however, occur at any time prior to that date, beginning 1 July 1951. The Plan listed in broad terms the objectives and priorities which were to be achieved in Rumania in relation to the Cold War, Transition, and General War periods. Project QKEROIL was conceived to implement the CPC Plan for Rumania and, in this respect, the most readily apparent weaknesses of the project was its extremely flexible developmental phasing pattern and its unlimited objectives in the fields of PP and FM activities.

**1. Establishment of a Political Center**

Much exhaustive effort was spent to develop an NOFE Political Center (Rumanian National Refugee Organization) as cover for overt activities and a covert operational support arm for projected CPC operations. This effort met with consistent failure. One of the difficulties encountered stemmed from the fact that the financial support the Rumanian emigration received from U.S. sources rendered it attractive to exploitation by those refugees who were interested in furthering their own or their parties' political aims. Further, the component political elements of the two Rumanian organizations looked upon the organizations not as national instruments for the attainment of Rumanian objectives, but as political vehicles for the attainment of personal or party political ends. To the Rumanians, it appeared, the actual purport of an emigre organization was that of a Government-in-exile, the control and exploitation of which was a legitimate objective for all ambitious Rumanian politicians in exile.

The Rumanian emigration failed to achieve maximum prestige by not rallying to itself all suitable national elements in exile. Two separate factions developed as a result and each faction expended all its energies in organizing and expanding the separate interests and taking care of the financial needs of each faction's political followers. In addition, two component offices of CIA found themselves supporting each of the opposing factions.

From the QKEROIL standpoint, the Rumanian emigration was often handled by NOFE in a haphazard, devious and frequently frustrating manner. The task could have been performed more effectively, perhaps, by an individual who had not only a thorough knowledge of the political and social history and development of the country and the personalities concerned, but who also was in the position to follow closely CPC-Rumanian emigration operations, such as a qualified CPC staff officer, under NOFE cover.

While a Rumanian National Committee embracing all factions of the emigration has never been a reality, the responsibility for this impasse cannot be laid to Project QKEROIL. In the case of Bulgaria and Albania, although the committees were unified to the extent that SE activities have



# THE VIOLETS OF JACOB: PART 2

[illegible]

2. The purpose of the proposed project is to develop a system which will be able to provide information on the status of the project and to provide information on the status of the project and to provide information on the status of the project.